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Abstract—We present a comprehensive survey of Voice over
IP security academic research, using a set of 245 publications
forming a closed cross-citation set. We classify these papers
according to an extended version of the VoIP Security Alliance
(VoIPSA) Threat Taxonomy. Our goal is to provide a roadmap
for researchers seeking to understand existing capabilities and
to identify gaps in addressing the numerous threats and vulner-
abilities present in VoIP systems. We discuss the implications of
our findings with respect to vulnerabilities reported in a variety
of VoIP products.
We identify two specific problem areas (denial of service,
and service abuse) as requiring significant more attention from
the research community. We also find that the overwhelming
majority of the surveyed work takes a black box view of
VoIP systems that avoids examining their internal structure
and implementation. Such an approach may miss the mark
in terms of addressing the main sources of vulnerabilities,
i.e., implementation bugs and misconfigurations. Finally, we
argue for further work on understanding cross-protocol and
cross-mechanism vulnerabilities (emergent properties), which are
the byproduct of a highly complex system-of-systems and an
indication of the issues in future large-scale systems.
Index Terms—VoIP, SIP, security
I. INTRODUCTION
VoIP refers to a class of products that enable advanced
communication services over data networks. While voice is
a key aspect in such products, video and other capabilities
(e.g., collaborative editing and whiteboard sharing, file sharing,
calendaring) are supported. The key advantages of VoIP are
flexibility and low cost. The former derives from the (gener-
ally) open architectures and software-based implementation,
while the latter is due to new business models, equipment and
network-link consolidation, and ubiquitous consumer-grade
broadband connectivity.
Due to these benefits, VoIP has seen rapid uptake in both the
enterprise and consumer markets. An increasing number of en-
terprises are replacing their internal phone switches with VoIP-
based implementations, both to introduce new features and to
eliminate redundant equipment. Consumers have embraced a
slew of technologies with different features and costs, includ-
ing P2P calling (Skype), Internet-to-PSTN network bridging,
and wireless VoIP. These new technologies and business
models are being promoted by a new generation of startup
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companies that are challenging the traditional status quo in
telephony and personal telecommunications. As a result, a
number of PSTN providers have already completed or are
in the process of transitioning from circuit-switched networks
to VoIP-friendly packet-switched backbones. Finally, as the
commercial and consumer sectors go, so do governments and
militaries due to cost reduction concerns and the general
dependence on Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) equipment
for the majority of their computing needs.
Because of the need to seamlessly interoperate with the
existing telephony infrastructure, the new features, and the
speed of development and deployment, VoIP protocols and
products have been repeatedly found to contain numerous
vulnerabilities [1], [2], [3] that have been exploited [4], [5],
[6]. As a result, a fair amount of research has been directed
towards addressing some of these issues. However, the effort is
unbalanced, with little effort spent on some highly deserving
problem areas.
This comprehensive survey covers 245 VoIP security re-
search papers and books, complementing our previous work
that analyzed known vulnerabilities [1], [2], [3]. Our primary
goal is to create a roadmap of existing work in securing
VoIP, towards reducing the start-up effort required by other
researchers to initiate research in this space. A secondary goal
is to identify gaps in existing research, and to help inform the
security community of challenges and opportunities for further
work. Finally, in the context of the VAMPIRE project1 we
seek to provide guidance as to what further work in needed
to better understand and analyze the activities of attackers.
We classify these papers according to the class of threat
they seek to address, using an extended version of the VoIP
Security Alliance (VoIPSA) [7] threat taxonomy. We discuss
our findings, and contrast them with our previous survey on
VoIP vulnerabilities.
Paper Organization: Section II provides a brief overview
of SIP, perhaps the most popular VoIP technology currently in
use. Section III summarizes the threat taxonomy as defined
by the VoIP Security Alliance. Our survey of the research
literature is given in Section IV. We then discuss our findings
in Section V.
II. SIP OVERVIEW
We focus our attention on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
[8], a popular and widely deployed technology. Most research
has focused on SIP, primarily because of its wide use and the
1http://vampire.gforge.inria.fr/
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availability of a number of free and open-source implementa-
tions.
SIP is a protocol standardized by the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), and is designed to support the setup
of bidirectional communication sessions including, but not
limited to, VoIP calls. It is similar in some ways to HTTP, in
that it is text-based, has a request-response structure, and even
uses a mechanism based on the HTTP Digest Authentication
[9] for user authentication. However, it is an inherently state-
ful protocol that supports interaction with multiple network
components (e.g., middleboxes such as PSTN bridges), and
asynchronous notifications. While its finite state machine is
seemingly simple, in practice it has become quite large and
complicated — an observation supported by the fact that the
main SIP RFC [8] is one of the longest ever defined, with
additional RFCs further extending the specification.
SIP is a signaling protocol, relying on RTP [10] for media
transfer. There exists an RTP profile (named Secure RTP, or
SRTP [11]) that supports encryption and integrity, but is not
yet widely used. The RTP protocol family also includes RTCP,
which is used to control certain RTP parameters between
communicating endpoints.
SIP can operate over a number of transport protocols,
including TCP [12], UDP [13] and SCTP [14]. UDP is gener-
ally the preferred method due to simplicity and performance,
although TCP has the advantage of supporting TLS protection
of call setup. However, recent work on Datagram TLS (DTLS)
[15] may render this irrelevant. SCTP, on the other hand,
offers several advantages over both TCP and UDP, including
DoS resistance [16], multi-homing and mobility support, and
logical connection multiplexing over a single channel.
In the SIP architecture, the main entities are endpoints
(whether softphones or physical devices), a proxy server, a
registrar, a redirect server, and a location server. Figure 1
shows a high-level view of the SIP entity interactions. The
registrar, proxy and redirect servers may be combined, or they
may be separate entities operated independently. Endpoints
communicate with a registrar to indicate their presence. This
information is stored in the location server. A user may be
registered via multiple endpoints simultaneously.
During call setup, the endpoint communicates with the
proxy which uses the location server to determine where the
call should be routed to. This may be another endpoint in the
same network (e.g., within the same enterprise), or another
proxy server in another network. Alternatively, endpoints may
use a redirect server to directly determine where a call should
be directed to; redirect servers consult with the location server
in the same way that proxy servers operate during call setup.
Once an end-to-end channel has been established (through one
or more proxies) between the two endpoints, SIP negotiates
the actual session parameters (such as the codecs, RTP ports,
etc.) using the Session Description Protocol (SDP) [17].
Figure 2 shows the message exchanges during a two-party
call setup. Alice sends an INVITE message to the proxy server,
optionally containing session parameter information encoded
within SDP. The proxy forwards this message directly to Bob,
if Alice and Bob are users of the same domain. If Bob is
registered in a different domain, the message will be relayed
RINGING
Alice Proxy/Proxies Bob
Media Transfer (RTP)
INVITE Bob
INVITE Bob@10.0.0.1
OK from Bob@10.0.0.1
OK from Bob@10.0.0.1
ACK Bob, route Bob@10.0.0.1
ACK Bob, route Bob@10.0.0.1
BYE Bob@10.0.0.1
BYE Bob@10.0.0.1
OK
OK
TRYING
RINGING
TRYING
Fig. 2. Message exchanges during a SIP-based two-party call setup.
to Bob’s proxy, and from there to Bob. Note that the message
may be forwarded to multiple endpoints, if Bob is registered
from multiple locations. While these are ringing (or otherwise
indicating that a call setup is being requested), RINGING
messages are sent back to Alice. Once the call has been
accepted, an OK message is sent to Alice, containing his
preferred parameters encoded within SDP. Alice responds with
an ACK message. Alice’s session parameter preferences may
be encoded in the INVITE or the ACK message.
Following this exchange, the two endpoints can begin trans-
mitting voice, video or other content (as negotiated) using the
agreed-upon media transport protocol, typically RTP. While
the signaling traffic may be relayed through a number of SIP
proxies, the media traffic is exchanged directly between the
two endpoints. When bridging different networks, e.g., PSTN
and SIP, media gateways may disrupt the end-to-end nature
of the media transfer. These entities translate content (e.g.,
audio) between the formats that are supported by the different
networks.
Because signaling and media transfer operate independently,
the endpoints are responsible for indicating to the proxies that
the call has been terminated, using a BYE message which is
relayed through the proxies along the same path as the call
setup messages.
There are many other protocol interactions supported by
SIP, that cover many common (and uncommon) scenarios
including call forwarding (manual or automatic), conference
calling, voicemail, etc. Typically, this is done by semantically
overloading SIP messages such that they can play various
roles in different parts of the call. We shall see in Section III
examples of how this flexibility and protocol modularity can
be used to attack the system.
SIP traffic is typically transmitted over port 5060 (UDP
or TCP), although the port can vary based on configuration
parameters. The ports used for the media traffic, however, are
dynamic and negotiated via SDP during call setup. This poses
some problems when Network Address Translation (NAT) or
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Fig. 1. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) entity interactions. User Alice registers with her domain’s Registrar (1), which stores the information in the Location
Server (2). When placing a call, Alice contacts her local Proxy Server (3), which may consult the Location Server (4). A call may be forwarded to another
Proxy Server (5), which will consult its domain Location Server (6) before forwarding the call to the final recipient. After the SIP negotiation terminates,
RTP is used directly between Alice and Bob to transfer media content. For simplicity, this diagram does not show the possible interaction between Alice and
a Redirection Server (which would, in turn, interact with the Location Server).
407 Authentication Required
Alice
INVITE sip:Bob@D2
BobDomain D1
Registrar/Proxy
INVITE sip:Bob@D2
RINGING
OK
ACK sip:Bob@D2
Media Transfer (RTP)
OK
RINGING
ACK sip:Bob@D2
nonce="12cc9a63", algorithm=MD5
response="12acb23970af",
realm="D1", uri="sip:Bob@D2",
Digest username="Alice",
Proxy authorization:
INVITE sip:Bob@D2
ACK sip:Bob@D2
    realm="D1", nonce="12cc9a63"
    Digest algorithm=MD5,
Proxy−Authenticate:
Fig. 3. SIP Digest Authentication
firewalls are traversed. Typically, these have to be stateful
and understand the SIP exchanges so that they can open the
appropriate RTP ports for the media transfer. In the case of
NAT traversal, endpoints may use protocols like STUN to
enable communication. Alternatively, the Universal Plug-and-
Play (uPnP) protocol 2 may be used in some environments,
such as residential broadband networks consisting of a single
subnet behind a NAT gateway.
For authenticating endpoints, the registrar and the proxy
typically use HTTP Digest Authentication, as shown in Fig-
ure 3. This is a simple challenge-response protocol that uses
a shared secret key along with a username, domain name, a
nonce, and specific fields from the SIP message to compute a
cryptographic hash. Passwords are not transmitted in plaintext
form over the network. It is worth noting that authentication
2http://www.upnp.org/
may be requested at almost any point during a call setup.
We shall later see an example where this can be abused by a
malicious party to conduct toll fraud in some environments.
For more complex authentication scenarios, SIP can use
S/MIME encapsulation [18] to carry complex payloads, in-
cluding public keys and certificates. When TCP is used as the
transport protocol for SIP, TLS can be used to protect the SIP
messages. TLS is required for communication among proxies,
registrars and redirect servers, but only recommended between
endpoints and proxies or registrars. Alternatively, IPsec [19]
may be used to protect all communications, regardless of
the transport protocol. However, because few implementations
integrate SIP, RTP and IPsec, it is left to system administrators
to setup and manage such configurations.
III. VOIP THREAT CLASSIFICATION
To classify the surveyed work, we use the taxonomy pro-
vided by the Voice over IP Security Alliance (VoIPSA)3.
VoIPSA is a vendor-neutral, not for profit organization com-
posed of VoIP and security vendors, organizations and indi-
viduals with an interest in securing VoIP protocols, products
and installations. The VoIPSA security threat taxonomy [7]
aims to define the security threats against VoIP deployments,
services, and end users. The key elements of this taxonomy
are:
1) Social threats are aimed directly against humans. For
example, misconfigurations, bugs or bad protocol inter-
actions in VoIP systems may enable or facilitate attacks
that misrepresent the identity of malicious parties to
users. Such attacks may then act as stepping stones
to further attacks such as phishing, theft of service, or
unwanted contact (spam).
2) Eavesdropping, interception, and modification
threats cover situations where an adversary can
unlawfully and without authorization from the parties
concerned listen in on the signaling (call setup) or the
3http://www.voipsa.org/
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content of a VoIP session, and possibly modify aspects
of that session while avoiding detection. Examples of
such attacks include call re-routing and interception of
unencrypted RTP sessions.
3) Denial of service threats have the potential to deny
users access to VoIP services. This may be particularly
problematic in the case of emergencies, or when a
DoS attack affects all of a user’s or organization’s
communication capabilities (i.e., when all VoIP and data
communications are multiplexed over the same network
which can be targeted through a DoS attack). Such
attacks may be VoIP-specific (exploiting flaws in the
call setup or the implementation of services), or VoIP-
agnostic (e.g., generic traffic flooding attacks). They
may also involve attacks with physical components (e.g.,
physically disconnecting or severing a cable) or through
computing or other infrastructures (e.g., disabling the
DNS server, or shutting down power).
4) Service abuse threats covers the improper use of VoIP
services, especially (but not exclusively) in those situa-
tions where such services are offered in a commercial
setting. Examples of such threats include toll fraud and
billing avoidance [5], [6].
5) Physical access threats refer to inappropri-
ate/unauthorized physical access to VoIP equipment, or
to the physical layer of the network (following the ISO
7-layer network stack model).
6) Interruption of services threats refer to non-intentional
problems that may nonetheless cause VoIP services to
become unusable or inaccessible. Examples of such
threats include loss of power due to inclement weather,
resource exhaustion due to over-subscription, and per-
formance issues that degrade call quality.
In our discussion and classification of related work that
follows, we focus on the first four elements of the taxonomy,
since the last two are largely outside the scope of computer
security research. In addition to these four categories, we also
use the following:
• Overviews and Surveys covers work that does not offer
any original technical research, but rather summarize
attacks and defenses in VoIP. While valuable in helping
understand the problem space, such works are generally
(but not always) fairly narrow in scope and do not
typically suggest solutions to the problems surveyed;
at best, they summarize existing/known techniques and
mechanisms for mitigating those problems.
• Field Studies and System/Protocol Analysis covers
work that analyzes software, protocols, and systems using
a variety of techniques.
• Performance Analysis covers work that measures the
performance impact of security mechanisms, both on call
setup (authentication costs) and on media transfer.
• Authentication Protocols covers work that proposes
extensions or variants of authentication mechanisms and
algorithms with SIP. Typically, these papers have a strong
cryptographic element, with VoIP used primarily as a
motivating environment.
• Architectures covers work that defines cross-cutting ap-
proaches to secure VoIP. In the surveyed work, a signif-
icant portion of these papers revolves around intrusion
detection systems.
• Middleboxes covers work that describes new firewall
architectures or mechanisms for enabling VoIP to work
with the current generation of firewalls.
• Intrusion Detection covers other intrusion and anomaly
detection work that could not be easily classified in any
of the previous categories.
• Miscellaneous includes other work that does not fit in
the remainder of the classification.
Figure 4 graphically depicts our overall classification
scheme, annotated with the number of items in each category.
IV. SURVEY OF VOIP SECURITY RESEARCH
A. Collection Methodology
We used a structured approach to compiling the list of
papers. While we do not claim to have all VoIP security
papers, we have identified as many as was possible using our
methodology. The process we used was:
• Compile an initial collection of papers, based on:
– Personal knowledge (direct and through recommen-
dation) of specific papers.
– Searches on CiteSeer, IEEE Xplore, ACM Digital
Library and Google Scholar (keywords used were
“VoIP security”, “SIP security”, “VoIP vulnerabil-
ities”, “SIP vulnerabilities”, “SIP attacks”, “VoIP
attacks”).
– Browsing the proceedings of top security confer-
ences and journals (IEEE Security & Privacy Sympo-
sium, ISOC Symposium on Network and Distributed
Systems Security, ACM Computer and Communi-
cations Security, USENIX Security, RAID, ACM
Transactions on Information and Systems Security,
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Com-
puting), and some area-specific workshops (e.g.,
VoIP Security Workshop) from the past 5 years.
• Expand this selection by:
– Fetching all relevant cited papers not already in the
collection.
– Browsing the proceedings of conferences or journals
in which these cited papers appeared, to identify
other relevant papers.
– Searching for other VoIP security papers by the
authors of these cited papers.
• Iterate until no new papers are added to the collection.
In addition, a few more papers were suggested by anony-
mous reviewers, as part of the review process for this paper.
The same algorithm was used, and expanded the 3 initial
suggestions to 12 total additional papers. In the process, we
discovered a case of plagiarism for papers that were published
6 years apart; we notified the authors and journal editors
involved.
In order to avoid a lopsided distribution of papers (and
an infinite expansion), we did not include in the collection
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Miscellaneous (2)
Intrusion Detection (11)
Middleboxes (11)
Architectures (19)
Authentication Protocols (15)
Performance Analysis (14)
Field Studies and System/Protocol Analysis (12)
P2P SIP (1)
DoS (1)
SPIT (6)
General overviews (42)
Overviews and Surveys (50)
Additional Categories (134 items)
Service Abuse (7)
Denial of Service (31)
Defenses (18)
Attacks (12)
Traffic Attacks (30)
Location (1)
Miscellaneous on SPIT (2)
Anti-SPIT architectures (7)
CAPTCHAs and puzzles (4)
Policy-based approaches (3)
Content-based detection (1)
Reputation, behavior, and identity (25)
Social Threats (43)
VoIPSA (111 items)
Classification (245 items)
Fig. 4. Classification tree
papers that were deemed of only peripheral relevance to VoIP
or VoIP security. The result of this process (modulo any papers
inadvertently missed) was 245 publications.
In the following two sections, we discuss the related work
using the extended VoIPSA taxonomy, as described in Sec-
tion III. For each classification area, we give the paper count
as a crude indication of the level of activity.
B. VoIPSA-based Classification (111 items)
We now discuss the work that fits naturally within the first
four categories of the VoIPSA taxonomy, which constitutes
45% of the surveyed papers. All other work is further classified
and discussed in Section IV-C.
1) Social threats (43 items): The majority of work in this
area focuses on SPam over Internet Telephony (SPIT) detec-
tion and prevention, although there are other items included
in this category as well (e.g., secure principal binding). We
have broken down the work based on the general technical
approach taken, and discuss the work in rough chronological
order within each thrust; we use the same approach in the
remainder of the text. As we can see, the majority of work
has focused on reputation and behavior-based approaches.
a) Reputation, behavior, and identity (25 items): Sri-
vastava and Schulzrinne [20] describe DAPES, a system for
blocking SPIT calls and instant messages based on several
factors, including the origin domain of the initiator (caller),
the confidence level in the authentication performed (if any),
whether the call is coming through a known open proxy, and
a reputation system for otherwise unknown callers. They give
an overview of other reputation-based systems and compare
them with DAPES.
Dantu and Kolan [21] show that it is possible to use as a
detection mechanism for high-volume SPIT the velocity and
acceleration (first- and second-order derivative of the number)
of incoming calls from a user, host or domain. Once either of
these values exceeds a threshold, related calls can be dropped.
The same method can also mitigate against certain VoIP-based
denial of service attacks.
MacIntosh and Vinokurov [22] propose a statistical de-
tection algorithm for SPIT that can be implemented at the
receiver’s server. For each external entity that communicates
with local users, their system keeps track of the number of
call setups and terminations in both directions (incoming and
outgoing). Simultaneous deviation of two or more of these
counters from their assumed long-term averages supposedly
indicates spam activity, with confidence increasing as the
deviation widens. The approach assumes that attackers cannot
rapidly change their identity.
Croft and Olivier [23] propose extending the call setup
process by adding a “call me back” scheme using a Verifying
Authority (VA) and a Mediator. The Mediator acts as a call
bridge, allowing the call to connect only once the VA has
approved it (possibly based on policy and on such information
as caller/callee identities, location and time of the call, etc.).
The user receives the “call me back” request from the VA, and
decides whether to proceed with picking up the call based on
local policy and other information (e.g., CallerID).
Dantu and Kolan [24], [25] describe the Voice Spam Detec-
tor (VSD), a multi-stage SPIT filter based on trust, reputation,
and feedback among the various filter stages. The primary filter
stages are call pattern and volume analysis, black and white
lists of callers, per-caller behavior profile based on Bayesian
classification and prior history, and reputation information
from the callee’s contacts and social network. They provide a
formal model for trust and reputation in a voice network, based
on intuitive human behavior. They evaluate their system in a
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laboratory experiment using a small number of real users and
injected SPIT calls.
Rebahi and Sisalem [26] develop the concept of the “SIP
social network” as a means for managing reputation toward
countering SPIT. However, no experimental evaluation or val-
idation of any of these schemes is performed. Rebahi et al. [27]
extend the previous by proposing two schemes for protecting
against SPIT and SPIM (spam over instant messaging). The
first uses reputation, with users indicating how much “trust”
they have in the persons in their contact lists. These lists (and
the trust values) are posted in a directory, where others can
access them upon receiving a call from a previously unknown
(to them) entity. This scheme requires that every user’s contact
information be published, and that attackers cannot mask or
change their identities. The second scheme is built around the
notion of “payment at risk”, wherein a caller may be required
to deposit a small amount to a SIP server prior to placing a
call, depending on the callee’s or the SIP proxy’s policy. If
the user indicates that the call was SPIT, the payment is then
forfeit.
Hansen et al. [28] present SPIT-AL, an anomaly detection
system seeking to identify SPIT calls. Their system takes
into consideration information about the caller (such as Cal-
lerID, IP address, whitelists/blacklists, etc.) and the call (e.g.,
time), and allows for different responses (grey-listing, audio
CAPTCHA, etc.). A key element of their architecture is that
users manage their own rules and responses, in order to comply
with the various German telecommunication laws.
Baumann et al. [29] overview SPIT threats and various
defense mechanisms. They then propose to prevent Sybil at-
tacks in SIP by binding user identities to biometric information
(specifically voice fingerprint) that is stored in global servers.
Users wishing to place calls must first prove their identity,
thereafter receiving credentials that can be used to place calls.
Madhosingh [30] integrates white and black lists with
CAPTCHAs for those callers that are not a priori known (and
included in a whitelist or a blacklist). If the test is passed,
the call is allowed through. However, such callers are not
allowed to leave voicemail messages to the callee’s system;
instead, such messages are stored on the caller’s local SIP
server, and the callee is sent an indication about the availability
of a voicemail and instructions on how to retrieve it.
Bertrand et al. [31] propose an anomaly detection technique
for identifying and blocking SPIT that creates caller profiles
based on their IP address. The criteria used by in their analysis
includes number of received error messages, the use of a
directory service, whether multiple calls are placed by the
same caller, the duration of calls and the variance of call
duration across multiple calls, and the number of simultaneous
incoming calls (from multiple different users) to the same
user. In response to an identified SPIT call, their system rate
limits call delivery, temporary blacklists the most aggressive
callers, or redirects the call to a voicemail or other automated
system that notifies the caller of the problem. They propose
implementing this functionality in the network, where it will
work together with routers. Because of this choice, their
system must do real-time layer 7 reconstruction and analysis
of traffic, which in turn requires hardware support to keep up
with the volume. Such a system should be able to handle up
to 106 simultaneous sessions, for 105 subscribers, with 104 in-
coming calls per second. They present a prototype Java-based
implementation running on Linux, using the netfilter
and iptables components to divert and block traffic. Their
performance evaluation shows that this prototype can handle
80 incoming calls per second, adding approximately 5ms to
the average 5.8 seconds call establishment time.
Yan et al. [32] argue for the use of active fingerprinting
in SPIT prevention systems. Protocol implementations inter-
pret the standards in slightly different ways, especially with
respect to indicating errors. Thus, it is possible to identify
the implementation of a peer SIP device by observing its
responses to a set of specially crafted messages. These may
be either standards-compliant or non-compliant. By creating a
number of different tests, it is possible to actively fingerprint
a remote SIP device that is trying to initiate a call. Their
conjecture is that malicious SIP user agents will not be able
to mimic legitimate stacks because of the diversity in possible
responses, and because often such tools implement only a
subset of SIP. In their analysis, they were able to create unique
fingerprints for 20 different SIP devices. The system evaluation
was limited to a performance (throughput) oriented experiment
using PlanetLab.
Balasubramaniyan et al. [33] propose to use call duration
and social network graphs to establish a measure of reputation
for callers. Their intuition is that users whose call graph has a
relatively small fan-out and whose call durations are relatively
long are less likely to be spammers. Conversely, users who
place a lot of very short calls are likely to be engaging in
SPIT. Furthermore, spammers will receive few (if any) calls.
Their system works both when the parties in a call have
a social network link between them, and when such a link
does not exist by assigning global reputation scores. Users
that are mistakenly categorized as spammers are redirected
to a Turing test, allowing them to complete the call if they
answer correctly. In a simulation-based evaluation, the authors
determine that their system can achieve a false negative rate
of 10% and a false positive rate of 3%, even in the presence
of large numbers of spammers.
Ono and Schulzrinne [34] propose the use of weak social
ties as a means to label calls with unknown or incomplete
caller ID information, in conjunction with a blacklist/whitelist
filtering scheme. As one specific mechanism, they describe the
use of weakly secret information that a user makes available
to potential callers, who must then use that information in
future calls. Another similar technique involves callers provid-
ing contact/identifying information to potential future callees.
Both of these schemes exploit cross-media interactions, lever-
aging the fact that most calls are associated with some other
interaction between the caller and callee entities. For example,
an e-commerce web site may accept such a weak secret from
a customer, or provide one (depending on the scheme); this
secret would then be used when calling the customer in the
future.
Guang-Yu et al. [35] describe a multi-layer SPIT detection
and prevention architecture that takes into consideration the
behavioral characteristics of specific types of SPIT campaigns,
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starting from the reconnaissance phase.
Patankar et al. [36] compare two SPIT detectors derived
from the email spam domain. One of these techniques is based
on user reputation through a referral social network model,
while the other assigns a trust value to incoming SIP messages
based on their direct prior interactions with the caller. Their
simulations indicate that the referral-based model is more
effective, correctly identifying SPIT in over 98% of cases. In
an environment with little-to-moderate amounts of SPI, this
likely be sufficient by itself. If the level of SPIT approaches
the current (circa 2010) levels of email spam, then additional
filtering/blocking mechanisms would have to be employed.
Wu et al. [37] apply semi-supervised clustering to call pa-
rameters (with optional user feedback) in order to distinguish
SPIT from non-SPIT calls. The evaluation, which was done
using manually created call traces, shows that the approach is
scalable (in the number of calls) and offers reasonable detec-
tion performance. Hyung-Jong et al. [38] describe a behavior-
based system that seeks to identify likely SPIT callers.
Sorge and Seedorf [39] apply reputation techniques to the
SPIT problem, by evaluating the quality of information (tags)
attached to outgoing calls by the callers’ SIP-based service
provider (SSP). Their scheme allows receiving SIP providers
to evaluate the likelihood of a call being SPIT using caller-SSP
information, providing incentives to honest SSPs to correctly
tag their outbound calls. They demonstrate, through analytical
means, that the precision of their SPIT detection improves
by almost 50% even in a limited trust case, with greater
improvements as longer trust chains of SSPs are taken into
consideration.
Phithakkitnukoon and Dantu propose the use of user feed-
back in closed email systems (such as Gmail) to identify
spammers [40]. The challenge in their scheme, which envi-
sions a binary “spammer/non-spammer” classification is to
choose an appropriate threshold for determining when this
transition occurs so as not to misclassify benign users who
were accidentally or maliciously tagged as spammers.
b) Content-based detection (1 item): Po¨rschmann and
Knospe [41] propose a SPIT detection mechanism based on
applying spectral analysis to the audio data of VoIP calls
to create acoustic fingerprints. SPIT calls are identified by
detecting a large number of fingerprints across a large number
of different calls.
c) Policy-based approaches (3 items): Tschofenig et al.
[42] propose the use of a SIP Authentication service that uses
the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) to specify
authentication requirements for SIP callers prior to placing a
call. The relevant information (e.g., identity) is then forwarded
to the receiver, which can use similar SAML policies to
determine whether they are willing to receive the call.
d’Heureuse et al. [43] describe an anti-SPIT system that
integrates user roles and personal preferences in its approach to
blocking unwanted calls. Their system allows users to express
their requirements and current status using a policy language
based on an extended version of the IETF-standardized Call
Processing Language (CPL). The authors give some paper
examples of how users might use such a system, and briefly
describe a prototype implementation.
Soupionis et al. [44] propose a policy-based approach for
defending against SPIT. They use a rules-based approach
to SPIT detection, combined with a number of mitigation
strategies and mechanisms that policy can invoke in response
to detection.
d) CAPTCHAs and puzzles (4 items): Banerjee et al. [45]
propose the use of computational puzzles as part of the identity
(public/private key pair) generation phase in peer-to-peer VoIP
networks to prevent spammers from creating large numbers
of disposable identities. Once identities become harder to
generate on demand, trust and reputation-based mechanisms
can be used to manage SPIT.
Quittek et al. [46] propose the use of hidden Turing tests to
identify SPIT callers. As a concrete approach, they leverage
the interaction model in human conversation, which minimizes
the amount of simultaneous (“double”) talk by the participants,
and the fact that there is a short pause at the beginning of
an answered call, followed by a statement by the callee that
initiates the conversation. By looking for signs of violation of
such norms, it is possible to identify naı¨ve automated SPIT
callers. The authors implement their scheme and integrate it
with a VoIP firewall.
Wang [47] describes an end-point audio CAPTCHA system
for countering SPIT, meant to be installed and used by users
and system administrators. She conducts a usability study, ex-
amining the installation and management overhead of the tool
(including the design and recording of challenge questions),
the understandability and time-to-answer of the system and the
questions by legitimate callers, and correctness in answering.
For the latter metric, she focuses specifically on English-as-
Second-Language users. Lindqvist and Komu [48] describe
a similar approach using image human-interaction proofs in
conjunction with SIP.
e) Anti-SPIT architectures (7 items): Niccolini [49] dis-
cusses the difficulties in protecting against IP telephony spam
(SPIT) and overviews the various approaches for blocking such
calls, identifying the technical and operational problems with
each. Possible building blocks for SPIT prevention include
blacklists/whitelists combined with strong identity verification
to provide a reliable CallerID system, referral-based systems
among trusted SIP domains [50], [51], pattern or anomaly
detection techniques to discriminate SPIT based on training
data, multi-level grey-listing of calls based on caller behavior
(similar to throttling) [52], [53], computational puzzles and
CAPTCHAs, explicit callee consent (a form of capability,
required to actually place a call), content filtering on voicemail
spam, callee feedback to indicate whether a call was SPIT or
legitimate (typically combined with whitelisting/blacklisting,
and requiring strong identity), changing one’s SIP address
as soon as SPIT messages arrive, requiring a monetary fee
for the first contact, and legal action. Niccolini argues that
none of these methods by itself is likely to succeed, promotes
a modular and extensible approach to SPIT prevention, and
presents a high-level architecture with these properties that
was designed for use in a commercial SIP router.
Schlegel et al. [54] describe a framework for preventing
SPIT. They argue for a modular approach to identifying SPIT,
using hints from both signaling and media transfer. The first
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stage of their system looks at information that is available prior
to accepting the call, while the second stage interacts with a
caller (possibly prior to passing on the call to the callee).
The various components integrated in their system include
whitelists/blacklists, call statistics, IP/domain correlation, and
Turing tests. Their system also allows for feedback from the
callee to be integrated into the scoring mechanism, for use in
screening future calls. The evaluation focuses on scalability, by
measuring the response time to calls as call volumes increase.
A similar architecture, with some additional components, is
described by Quittek et al. [55] and later extended [56].
The SPIDER project (SPam over Internet telephony De-
tection sERvice) third public report [57] describes an anti-
SPIT architectural framework. (The first two reports are de-
scribed later, in Section IV-C1.) Elements of this architecture
include improved authentication, whitelisting/blacklisting, be-
havior analysis, the use of computational puzzles for chal-
lenge/response, reputation management, and audio content
analysis.
Mathieu et al. [58] describe SDRS, an anti-SPIT system that
combines several of detection schemes and takes into consider-
ation users’ and operators’ preferences. Gritzalis and Mallios
[59] survey various defenses against SPIT, and propose an
integrated framework for mitigating the various limitations of
each individual mechanism.
f) Miscellaneous on SPIT (2 items): Kolan et al. [60] use
traces of voice calls in a university environment to validate
a mathematical model for computing the nuisance level of
an incoming call, using feedback from the receivers. The
model is intended to be used in predicting SPIT calls in VoIP
environments, and is based on the history of prior commu-
nications between the two parties involved, which includes
explicit feedback from the receiver indicating that a call is
unwanted (at a particular point in time). Dritsas et al. [61]
combine several criteria that they argue define a SPIT call with
an ontology for SPIT, towards improving the management of
SPIT incidents.
g) Location (1 item): Kong et al. [62] propose a scheme
for securing the user location information in SIP, i.e., the
integrity and authenticity of the binding a principal’s SIP
URI and a correponding device’s contact/network address. The
threat addressed is tampering with the location information
of a user such that calls to that user are redirected to a
malicious party (impersonation) or are dropped (denial of
service). In their approach, users create temporary public
keys that are bound to their location and identity through the
SIP registration process, possibly leveraging the existing SIP
authentication mechanism used (or using some out-of-bound
mechanism for securing the binding). Users then digitally sign
their registration information, which the local registrar verifies
before sending to the location server. To allow entities in other
domains to verify the location information, the user public key
can be conveyed through a secure channel at the domain level,
e.g., by leveraging registrar public key certificates, or a pair-
wise shared secret key between two domains. This approach
assumes benign and reliable registrar servers. To mitigate this
weakness in the assumptions and to improve overall service
reliability, the authors also propose the use of Byzantine
Fault Tolerance techniques, adapting their protocols (public
key binding & querying, and user registration) to a quorum
environment. They conduct an experimental evaluation of their
non-replicated scheme, showing that it can achieve the same
performance as unsecured SIP and is 3–50 times faster than
TLS-protected SIP.
2) Eavesdropping, Interception, and Modification (30
items): Considerable work has been dedicated to protecting
and attacking VoIP signaling and data traffic. We divide the
work in two sub-categories, attacks and defenses.
a) Attacks (12 items): Wang et al. [63], [64] describe
a de-anonymization attack against VoIP streams that use
low-latency anonymity proxies. Their intuition is to insert a
watermark in the encrypted stream, tracking its propagation
across the network. The watermark used is a perturbation of
the inter-packet delay for selected packets in the stream. With
appropriate use of redundancy, they demonstrate a tracking
attack against 2-minute Skype calls across the Internet using
3 ms delays. Depending on the watermark parameters chosen,
they can achieve 99% true positive and 0% false positive rate
or 100% true positive and 0.1% false positive rate. Srivatsa
et al. [65] demonstrate flow-analysis attacks that expose the
privacy of peer-to-peer VoIP participants.
Shah et al. [66] examine the use of injected jitter into VoIP
as a covert channel to exfiltrate keyboard activity of interest
(e.g., passwords). This attack would be effective even when
the VoIP stream is encrypted.
Takahashi and Lee [67] examine the problem of covert
channels in VoIP protocols, identifying and quantifying several
ways in which data can be surreptitiously leaked out of a
user’s system or an enterprise network. As an example, they
demonstrate the steganographic insertion of a second voice
channel in a SIP-based VoIP conversation. This has the poten-
tial of leaking an otherwise secure (encrypted) conversation
through a secondary channel, or can be used to hide the true
communication content from an eavesdropper. They determine
such parameters as channel capacity and perceptual quality of
the encoded signal through experimental evaluation. They con-
clude with a discussion of several possible countermeasures
and detection methods.
Weiser et al. [68] provide an overview of the security
considerations in RTP, the media transfer protocol used in both
SIP and H.323. They analyze six different implementations,
discovering confidentiality (eavesdropping a call), integrity
(injecting voice into an ongoing call) and availability (perform-
ing DoS) compromises. This work assumes that no security
mechanism (such as SRTP) is used.
Wright et al. [69] apply machine learning techniques to
determine the language spoken in a VoIP conversation, when
a variable bit rate (VBR) voice codec is used based on the
length of the encrypted voice frame. As a countermeasure, they
propose the use of block ciphers for encrypting the voice. In
follow-on work [70] they use profile Hidden Markov Models
to identify specific phrases in the encrypted voice stream with
a 50% average accuracy, rising to 90% for certain phrases.
Wang et al. [71] evaluate the resilience of three commercial
VoIP services (AT&T, Vonage and Gizmo) against man-in-
the-middle adversaries. They show that it is possible for an
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attacker to divert and redirect calls in the first two services
by modifying the RTP endpoint information included in the
SDP exchange (which is not protected by the SIP Digest
Authentication), and to manipulate a user’s call forwarding
settings in the latter two systems. These vulnerabilities permit
for large-scale voice pharming, where unsuspecting users are
directed to fake interactive voice response systems or human
representatives. The authors argue for the need for TLS or
IPsec protection of the signaling.
Verscheure et al. [72] exploit the nature of human conver-
sation (i.e., alternating periods of talking and silence for each
participant) to reveal communication pairs over a period of
time. The technique does not work as well against systems that
do not use silence suppression, as these effectively introduce
a form of constant (voice) traffic padding in both directions.
Petraschek et al. [73] examine the usability and security of
ZRTP, a key agreement protocol based on the Diffie Hellman
key exchange, designed for use in VoIP environments that
lack pre-established secret keys among users or a public key
infrastructure (PKI). ZRTP is intended to be used with SRTP,
which performs the actual content encryption and transfer.
Because of the lack of a solid basis for authentication, which
makes active man-in-the-middle attacks easy to launch, ZRTP
uses Short Authentication Strings (SAS) to allow two users to
verbally confirm that they have established the same secret
key. The verbal communication serves as a weak form of
authentication at the human level. The authors identify a relay
attack in ZRTP, wherein a man-in-the-middle adversary can
influence the SAS read by two legitimate users with whom he
has established independent calls and ZRTP exchanges. The
attacker can use one of the legitimate users as an oracle to
pronounce the desired SAS string through a number of means,
including social engineering. The authors point out that SAS
does not offer any security in some communication scenarios
with high security requirements, e.g., a user calling (or being
called by) their bank. The authors implement their attack and
demonstrate it in a lab environment.
Zhang et al. [74] show that, by exploiting DNS and VoIP
implementation vulnerabilities, it is possible for attackers to
perform man-in-the-middle attacks even when they are not on
the direct communication path of the parties involved. They
demonstrate their attack against Vonage, requiring that the
attacker only knows the phone number and the IP address
of the target phone. Such attacks can be used to eavesdrop
and hijack the victims’ VoIP calls. The authors recommend
that users and operators use signaling and media protection,
conduct fuzzing and testing of VoIP implementations, and
develop a lightweight VoIP intrusion detection system to be
deployed on the VoIP phone.
b) Defenses (18 items): Guo et al. [75] propose a new
scheme for protecting voice content that provides strong
confidentiality guarantees while allowing for graceful voice
degradation in the presence of packet loss. They evaluate their
scheme via simulation and micro-benchmarks. However, Li et
al. [76] show that the scheme is insecure.
Bellovin et al. [77] argue against the enactment of leg-
islation (in the US) mandating the integration of lawful-
intercept capabilities into VoIP implementations. Their key
concerns is that, based on a history of system compromises
and implementation weaknesses, mandating such capabilities
would enable or ease attacks against personal communications
by adversaries that would otherwise be unable to conduct such
attacks. They suggest that lawful interception needs be met
either at the application provider or the network link level.
Seedorf [78] proposes the use of cryptographically gener-
ated SIP URIs to protect the integrity of content in P2P SIP.
Specifically, he uses self-certifying SIP URIs that encode a
public key (or, more compactly, the hash of a public key). The
owner of the corresponding private key can then post signed
location binding information on the peer-to-peer network (e.g.,
Chord) that is used by call initiators to determine call routing.
Fessi et al. [79] propose extensions to P2P SIP that pro-
vide location and interaction privacy for participants. They
develop a signaling protocol for P2P SIP that uses two differ-
ent Kademlia-based overlay networks for storing information
and forwarding traffic, respectively. Their scheme requires
a centralized authentication server, which provides verifiable
identities at the application/SIP layer. They consider attacks
against their scheme, shared with more general anonymity
systems (such as Tor). They use analytical models to estimate
communication reliability, cryptographic overhead, and end-
to-end signaling latency.
Talevski et al. [80] describe the addition of security (in the
form of encryption and integrity protection) to a lightweight
VoIP protocol suitable for mobile devices. Kuntze et al. [81]
propose a mechanism for providing non-repudiation of voice
content by using digital signatures, taking into consideration
packet losses by reporting to the sender which packets were
actually received.
Wang et al. [82] extend the SIP call setup to include a Diffie
Hellman based key exchange that results in multiple shared
keys that the parties switch among during the call in a deter-
ministic (but unknown to an adversary) fashion. Their stated
goal is to impede cryptanalytic attacks that depend on the same
shared secret key being used throughout a call. They conduct
a performance evaluation using a prototype implementation of
their scheme on software phones, concluding that the overhead
is negligible. The likely adoption of DTLS-SRTP would proba-
bly supersede this effort. Gurbani and Kolesnikov [83] discuss
DTLS-SRTP and SDES (another proposed protocol for media
protection), and propose a lightweight scheme that mitigates
some of the performance concerns and security weaknesses of
DTLS-SRTP.
Hlavacs et al. [84] propose the integration of computational
puzzles in ZRTP as a way to mitigate the man-in-the-middle
attack described earlier [73]. Effectively, their scheme places
an upper bound to the amount of time a ZRTP exchange may
take, placing the attacker under (hopefully) severe time con-
straint and making them unable to carry out the independent
but parallel calls that are necessary. The authors propose a new
puzzle scheme based on computing selected eigenvectors of
real symmetric matrices. An additional protection mechanism
suggested is to randomly delay (by short amounts of time)
the receiving of calls, again trying to make more difficult the
attacker’s task of orchestrating and playing against each other
two independent calls.
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Palmieri and Fiore [85] describe an adaptation of SIP to
provide end-to-end security using existing and well-known
primitives (e.g., digital signatures and efficient encryption
mechanisms). The authors developed a prototype implementa-
tion and conducted a performance analysis of their scheme.
One drawback of this scheme relative to ZRTP is that it
requires a PKI. When compared to at least some proposed
deployments of DTLS-SRTP, this scheme provides end-to-
end non-repudiation and end-to-end authentication while being
resistant to man-in-the-middle attacks.
Zhang and Berthold [86] discuss several passive traffic
analysis attacks on VoIP systems. These attacks exploit both
signaling and media flow information. They also discuss
techniques that can be used to mitigate some of these attacks,
and conclude with a list of open problems. Many of the attacks
and the countermeasures are shared with those in general-
purpose anonymity systems. Zhang and Fischer-Hu¨bner [87]
and Melchor et al. [88] also discuss techniques for protecting
the privacy of VoIP calls. The former studies an approach
based on using an anonymization overlay network (such as
Tor) with traffic padding (where the overlay knows what
traffic to drop because it is marked by the sender). The latter
discussed and evaluated (using an analytical model) the use of
MIXes to provide strong resistance against traffic analysis for
VoIP flows. Their scheme uses dummy traffic, broadcasting,
and private information retrieval as building blocks. Srivatsa
et al. [89] examined the problem of on-demand construction
of QoS-sensitive routes in anonymizing networks.
Elbayoumy and Shepherd [90] propose the use of TEA
(Tiny Encryption Algorithm) as a lightweight confidentiality
mechanism. Subsequently, they propose an adaptive scheme
where the selection of encryption algorithm to be used in
protecting traffic is made with consideration of the CPU
capabilities of both communicating parties [91], [92].
3) Denial of Service (31 items): Reynolds and Ghosal [93]
describe a multi-layer protection scheme against flood-based
application- and transport-layer denial of service (DoS) attacks
in VoIP. They use a combination of sensors located across the
enterprise network, continuously estimating the deviation from
the long-term average of the number of call setup requests
and successfully completed handshakes. Similar techniques
have been used in detecting TCP SYN flood attacks, with
good results. The authors evaluate their scheme via simulation,
considering several different types of DoS attacks and recovery
models.
Larson et al. [94], [95] experimentally analyzed the impact
of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on VoIP call
quality. They also established the effectiveness of low-rate
denial of service attacks that target specific vulnerabilities and
implementation artifacts to cause equipment crashes and re-
boots. They discuss some of the possible defenses against such
attacks and describe Sprint’s approach, which uses regional
“cleaning centers” which divert suspected attack traffic to a
centralized location with numerous screening and mitigation
mechanisms available. They recommend that critical VoIP traf-
fic stay on private networks, the use of general DDoS mech-
anisms as a front-line defense, VoIP-aware DDoS detection
and mitigation mechanisms, traffic policing and rate-limiting
mechanisms, the use of TCP for VoIP signaling (which makes
IP spoofing, and hence anonymous/unfilterable DoS attacks,
very difficult), extended protocol compliance checking by
VoIP network elements, and the use of authentication where
possible.
Bremler-Barr et al. [96] describe de-registration attacks in
SIP, wherein an adversary can force a user to be disassociated
with the proxy server and registrar, or to even divert that
user’s calls to any party (including to the attacker). This attack
works even when authentication is used, if the adversary can
eavesdrop on traffic between the client and the SIP proxy. They
demonstrate the attack against several SIP implementations,
and propose a protection mechanism that is similar to one-
time passwords.
Chen [97] describes a denial of service detection mechanism
that models the SIP transaction state machine and identifies
attacks by measuring the number of transaction and application
errors, the number of transactions per node, and the traffic
volume per transaction. If certain thresholds are exceeded, an
alert is generated. Chen does not describe how appropriate
thresholds can be established, other than to indicate that
historical records can be used.
Sengar et al. [98], [99] describe vFDS, an anomaly detection
system that seeks to identify flooding denial of service attacks
in VoIP. The approach taken is to measure abnormal variations
in the relationships between related packet streams using the
Hellinger distance, a measure of the deviation between two
probability measures. Using synthetic attacks, they show that
vFDS can detect flooding attacks that use SYN, SIP, or RTP
packets within approximately 1 second of the commencement
of an attack, with small impact on call setup latency and
voice quality. A similar approach, using Hellinger distance on
traffic sketches, is proposed by Tang et al. [100], overcoming
the limitations of the previous schemes against multi-attribute
attacks. Furthermore, their scheme does not require the con-
stant calculation of an accurate threshold (defining “normal”
conditions).
Zhang et al. [101] describe a denial of service attack
wherein adversaries flood SIP servers with calls involving
URIs with DNS names that do not exist. Servers attempting
to resolve them will then have to wait until the request times
out (either locally or at their DNS server), before they can
continue processing the same or another call. This attack works
against servers that perform synchronous DNS resolution and
only maintain a limited number of execution threads. They
experimentally show that as few as 1,000 messages per second
can cause a well provisioned synchronous-resolution server
to exhibit very high call drops, while simple, single-threaded
servers can be starved with even 1 message per second. As
a countermeasure, they propose the use of non-blocking DNS
caches, which they prototype and evaluate.
Fiedler et al. [102] present VoIP Defender, an open ar-
chitecture for monitoring SIP traffic, with a primary focus
on high-volume denial of service attacks. Their architecture
allows for a variety of detection methods to be integrated, and
several different attack prevention and mitigation mechanisms
to be used. Key design goals include transparency, scalability,
extensibility, speed and autonomous operation. Their evalua-
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tion of the prototype implementation consists exclusively of
performance measurements.
Conner and Nahrstedt [103] describe a semantic-level at-
tack that causes resource exhaustion on stateful SIP proxies
by calling parties that (legitimately or in collusion) do not
respond. This attack does not require network flooding or other
high traffic volume attacks, making it difficult to detect with
simple, network-based heuristics used against other types of
denial of service attacks. They propose a simple algorithm,
called Random Early Termination (RET) for releasing reserved
resources based on the current state of the proxy (overloaded
or not) and the duration of each call’s ringing. They implement
and evaluate their proposed scheme on a SIP proxy running in
a local testbed, showing that it reduces the number of benign
call failures when under attack, without incurring measurable
overheads when no attack is underway.
Luo et al. [104] experimentally evaluate the susceptibility
of SIP to CPU-based denial of service attacks. They use an
open-source SIP server in four attack scenarios: basic request
flooding, spoofed-nonce flooding (wherein the target server is
forced to validate the authenticator in a received message),
adaptive-nonce flooding (where the nonce is refreshed period-
ically by obtaining a new one from the server), and adaptive-
nonce flooding with IP spoofing. Their measurements show
that these attacks can have a large impact on the quality
of service provided by the servers. They propose several
countermeasures to mitigate against such attacks, indicating
that authentication by itself cannot solve the problem and that,
in some circumstances, it can exacerbate its severity. These
mitigation mechanisms include lightweight authentication and
whitelisting, proper choice of authentication parameters, and
binding of nonces to client IP addresses.
Fuchs et al. [105] apply anomaly detection techniques to
protect against VoIP-originated denial of service attacks at
the phone call level at public safety service centers (e.g.,
911 or 112 operators). Specifically, they use call traces from
normal operations to determine the level of calls coming
from the PSTN, GSM and VoIP networks during normal
operation and at disaster time. They then use these profiles to
discriminate against VoIP-based DoS attacks by limiting the
accepted number of calls that can originate from that domain,
building on previous work that identified the network of origin
as a potential discriminator [106]. Using call traces from a fire
department response center, they evaluate the call response rate
against the DoS attack intensity. Their analysis shows that it
is possible to identify such attacks early and to avoid false
positives if VoIP-originated calls under normal scenarios are
less than 27% of total call volume.
Hyun-Soo et al. [107] propose a detection mechanism for
de-registration and other call disruption attacks in SIP that
is based on message retransmission: when a server receives
an unauthenticated (but possibly legitimate) message M that
could disturb a call or otherwise deny service to a user, it
asks the user’s agent to retransmit the last SIP message sent
by that agent, as an implicit authenticator. If the retransmission
matches M (i.e., this was a legitimate request), the server
proceeds with its processing. If the retransmission does not
match M , or if multiple retransmissions are received within
a short time window (as may be the case when an attacker
can eavesdrop on the network link between the SIP proxy
and the user, identifying the request for retransmission), M is
discarded. However, the scheme requires a new SIP message
to signal that a retransmission is needed. Geneiatakis and Lam-
brinoudakis [108], [109] consider some of the same attacks,
and propose mitigation through an additional SIP header that
must be included in all messages and can cryptographically
validate the authenticity and integrity of control messages.
Ormazabal et al. [110] describe the design and implemen-
tation of a SIP-aware, rule-based application-layer firewall
that can handle denial of service (and other) attacks in the
signaling and media protocols. They use hardware acceleration
for the rule matching component, allowing them to achieving
filtering rates on the order of hundreds of transactions per
second. The SIP-specific rules, combined with state validation
of the endpoints, allow the firewall to open precisely the
ports needed for only the local and remote addresses involved
in a specific session, by decomposing and analyzing the
content and meaning of SIP signaling message headers. They
experimentally evaluate and validate the behavior of their
prototype with a distributed testbed involving synthetic benign
and attack traffic generation.
Ehlert et al. [111], [112] propose a two-layer DoS pre-
vention architecture for SIP. The first layer is comprised
of a bastion host that protects against well-known network-
layer attacks (such as TCP SYN flooding) and SIP-flooding
attacks. The second layer is located at the SIP proxy, and is
composed of modules that perform signature-based detection
of malformed SIP messages and a non-blocking DNS cache
to protect against attacks involving SIP URIs with irresolvable
DNS names [101]. They conduct a series of evaluations in an
experimental testbed, where they validate the effectiveness of
their architecture to block or mitigate a number of DoS attacks.
Ehlert et al. [113] separate propose and experimentally eval-
uate (via a testbed) a specification-based intrusion-detection
system for denial of service attacks. Geneiatakis et al. [114],
[115] use counting Bloom filters to detect messages that are
part of a denial of service attack in SIP by determining the
normal number of pending sessions for a given system and
configuration based on profiling.
Awais et al. [116] describe an anti-DoS architecture based
on bio-inspired anomaly detection. They compare their scheme
against a cryptography-based mechanism using synthetic traf-
fic. Similar work is described by Rebahi et al. [117]. Ak-
bar and Farooq [118] conduct a comparative evaluation of
several evolutionary and non-evolutionary machine learning
algorithms using synthetic SIP traffic datasets with different
levels of attack intensities and durations. They conclude that
different algorithms and settings are best suited for different
scenarios. The same authors subsequently apply anomaly
detection techniques to identify RTP fuzzing attacks that seek
to cause server crashes through malformed packet headers and
payloads [119]. They investigate several different classifiers,
analyzing their accuracy and performance using synthetic RTP
traces. Nassar et al. [120] use support vector machine (SVM)
classifiers on 38 distinct features in SIP traffic to identify SPIT
and DoS traffic. Their experiments using SIP traffic traces
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show good performance and high detection accuracy.
Rafique et al. [121] analyze the robustness and reliability
of SIP servers under DoS attacks. They launch a number of
synthesized attacks against four well-known SIP proxy servers
(OpenSER, PartySIP, OpenSBC, and MjServer). Their results
demonstrate the ease with which SIP servers can be overloaded
with call requests, causing such performance metrics as Call
Completion Rate, Call Establishment Latency, Call Rejection
Ration and Number of Retransmitted Requests to deteriorate
rapidly as attack volume increases, sometimes with as few
as 1,000 packets/second. As an extreme case of such attacks
large volumes of INVITE messages can even cause certain
implementations to crash. While valuable in documenting the
susceptibility to such attacks, this work proposes no defense
strategies or directions.
Akbar et al. [122] conduct an analysis of three anomaly de-
tection algorithms for detecting flood attacks in IMS: adaptive
threshold, cumulative sum, and Hellinger distance. They use
synthetic traffic data to determine the detection accuracy of
these algorithms in the context of a SIP server being flooded
with SIP messages.
Battistello [123] introduces a DoS-resistant protocol for
authenticated call establishment with key exchange across
different domains.
4) Service Abuse (7 items): Truong et al. [124] describe a
rules-based intrusion detection system for H.323 that uses an
FSM model to detect unexpected messages, aimed at identi-
fying illegitimate RAS (Registration, Admission and Status)
messages being forwarded to a H.323 gatekeeper.
Kotulski and Mazurczyk [125], [126], [127] propose the
use of steganographic and digital watermarking to embed
additional information into SIP traffic to provide stronger
origin authentication and content integrity guarantees in a
bandwidth-sensitive manner. Their scheme encodes the nec-
essary information into unused fields in the IP, UDP and RTP
protocol headers, and also into the transmitted voice.
Zhang et al. [128] present a number of exploitable vulnera-
bilities in SIP that can manipulate billing records in a number
of ways, showing their applicability against real commercial
VoIP providers. Their focus is primarily on attacks that create
billing inconsistencies, e.g., customers being charged for ser-
vice they did not receive, or over-charged for service received.
Some of these attacks require a man-in-the-middle capability,
while others only require some prior interaction with the target
(e.g., receiving a call from the victim SIP phone device).
Abdelnur et al. [129] use AVISPA to identify a protocol-
level vulnerability in the way SIP handles authentication
[130]. AVISPA is a model checker for validating security
protocols and applications using a high-level protocol spec-
ification and security-goals language that gets compiler into
an intermediate format that can be consumed by a number
of lower-level checkers. The attack is possible with the SIP
Digest Authentication, whereby an adversary can reuse another
party’s credentials to obtain unauthorized access to SIP or
PSTN services (such as calling a premium or international
phone line). This attack is possible because authentication
may be requested in response to an INVITE message at any
time during a call, and the responder may issue an INVITE
message during a call either automatically (because of timer
expirations) or through a user action (e.g., placing the caller
on hold in order to do a call transfer). While the solution
is simple, it requires changes possibly to all end-device SIP
implementations.
Geneiatakis et al. [131] address the problem of billing at-
tacks against telephony service providers and their users. They
propose an authentication-based scheme that leverages the
existing Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA)
infrastructure operated by the service provider to provide the
latter with explicit and non-repudiable call confirmation by the
call initiator. However, the scheme has not been implemented
or evaluated, experimentally or formally.
C. Additional Categories (134 items)
We now classify the remainder of the surveyed work
(55% of the total) using the following categories: Overviews
(19.7%), Field Studies and Analysis (4.9%), Performance
Analysis (5.7%), Authentication Protocols (6.1%), Architec-
ture (7.8%) Middleboxes (4.5%) Intrusion Detection (4.5%),
and Miscellaneous (0.8%).
1) Overviews and Surveys (50 items): There is a consider-
able body of work focusing on surveying and summarizing
risks and threats in SIP, and describing existing work on
defense mechanisms.
a) General overviews (42 items): Ackermann et al. [132]
describe threats in VoIP, focusing on specific attacks and
vulnerabilities as case studies. Hunter [133], Batchvarov [134],
Bradbury [135], and Chau [136] provide summaries of specific
security concerns in VoIP.
Sicker and Lookabaugh [137] discuss threats in VoIP and
the need for security to be integrated at design and deployment
time. Vuong and Bai [138] provide a brief survey of the types
of intrusion detection systems that can be used to monitor for
specific types of attacks in VoIP.
Geneiatakis et al. [139] describe how SQL injection attacks
can be launched through SIP, by including partial SQL state-
ments in certain fields of SIP protocol messages that are likely
to be used in subsequent database operations (e.g., parts of the
SIP URI in the To: field may be used to look up the location
of the user receiving the call). They demonstrate the attack in a
lab experiment, and briefly discuss the applicability of general
SQL injection defense mechanisms in a SIP environment.
Tucker [140] gives an overview of SIP and H.323, and
briefly mentions some security concerns (with an emphasis on
denial of service). Posegga and Seedorf [141] offer a similar
threat analysis. Edelson [142] discusses denial of service,
SPIT, eavesdropping and security of emergency calls, before
talking about the particular requirements of VoIP in wireless.
She concludes with a brief discussion of intrusion detection
for VoIP. Albers et al. [143] gives a high-level overview of
the types of vulnerabilities that SIP-based systems may be
exposed to, and discusses the capabilities and limitations of a
number of commercially available (as of 2005) SIP intrusion
prevention and testing systems. In a related publication, Mc-
Gann and Sicker [144] argue that several of the VoIP security
tools available in 2005 did not cover the extent of known
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vulnerabilities, do not provide the coverage claimed by the
developers, and were not user-friendly. A short overview of
some SIP security mechanisms is given by Geneiatakis et al.
[145].
Cao and Malik [146], [147] examine the vulnerabilities that
arise from introducing VoIP technologies into the communi-
cations systems in critical infrastructure applications. They
examine the usual threats and vulnerabilities, and discuss
mitigation techniques. They conclude by providing some rec-
ommendations and best practices to operators of such systems.
Allain [148] discusses the security challenges in VoIP envi-
ronments, focusing on a couple of specific issues to highlight
the tradeoffs. Adelsbach et al. [149] provide a comprehensive
description of SIP and H.323, a list of threats across all
networking layers, and various protection mechanisms. A
similar analysis was published by the US National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) [150]. An updated sum-
mary, with practical recommendations to users and opera-
tors is provided by Walsh and Kuhn [151]. Anwar et al.
[152] identify some areas where the NIST report remains
incomplete: counter-intuitive results with respect to the relative
performance of encryption and hash algorithms, the non-use of
the standardized Mean Opinion Score to evaluate call quality,
and the lack of anticipation of RTP-based denial of service.
They then propose the use of design patterns to address the
problems of secure traversal of firewalls and NAT boxes,
detecting and mitigating DoS attacks in VoIP, and securing
VoIP against eavesdropping.
Geneiatakis et al. [153] also survey a number of SIP security
vulnerabilities. Geneiatakis et al. [154] categorize potential
attacks on VoIP services, and provide recommendations and
guidelines for protecting the infrastructure. They use ontolo-
gies to represent these recommendations, and first-order logic
to translate them to a unified security policy for VoIP.
Me and Verdone [155] describe the security threats and
high-level vulnerabilities in SIP when used in 802.11 or
other similar wireless environments. Singhai and Sahoo [156]
describe the risks of VoIP technologies (focusing on SIP and
H.323) and compare them with the public switched telephony
network (PSTN). Rippon [157] provides a laundry list of
threats and mitigation techniques for VoIP systems. Brief
descriptions of some VoIP-related threats are given by Hung
and Martin [158], [159] and Zandi et al. [160].
Xin [161] provides a somewhat more detailed overview of
VoIP-related security concerns. Persky gives a very detailed
description of several VoIP vulnerabilities [162]. Quinten et
al. [163] survey the various techniques for preventing and
reducing SPIT, offering some suggestions as to possible com-
binations that increase overall blocking effectiveness. Hansen
and Woodward [164] overview threats in VoIP environments
and recommend that VoIP and data networks be logically
or physically separated. James and Woodward [165] propose
a security framework for end users of VoIP technologies,
combining a number of commonly available mechanisms and
recommendations.
Butcher et al. [166] overview security issues and mech-
anisms for VoIP systems, focusing on security-oriented op-
erational practices by VoIP providers and operators. Such
practices include the separation of VoIP and data traffic by
using VLANs and similar techniques, the use of integrity and
authentication for configuration bootstrapping of VoIP devices,
authentication of signaling via TLS or IPsec, and the use
of media encryption. They briefly describe how two specific
commercial systems implement such practices, and propose
some directions for future research.
A comprehensive discussion of threats and security so-
lutions is given by Thermos and Takanen [167]. Kurmus
and Garet [168] summarize a number of threats and specific
vulnerabilities using actual attack tools.
Sisalem et al. [169] provide an in-depth description of SIP
and IMS, discussing the security mechanisms available in each
part of the architecture. The focus particularly on the DoS and
SPIT threats, also describing some available countermeasures.
Gurbani and Kolesnikov [170] discuss in depth and com-
pare SDES, DTLS-SRTP, and ZRTP in terms features sup-
ported (e.g., conferencing, PSTN calling) and security fea-
tures/weaknesses (e.g., susceptibility to man-in-the-middle at-
tacks and key leakage). They conclude that all three are suit-
able, but they each offer a feature or suppress a vulnerability
that the others do not.
Keromytis [1], [2], [3] surveys over 200 vulnerabilities in
SIP implementations that were disclosed in the CVE database
from 1999 to 2009. He classifies these vulnerabilities along
several dimensions, including the VoIPSA threat taxonomy, the
traditional Confidentiality/Integrity/Availability concerns, and
a Protocol/Implementation/Configuration axis. He finds that
the various types of denial of service attacks constitute the
majority of disclosed vulnerabilities, over 90% of which were
due to implementation problems and 7% due to configuration.
b) SPIT (6 items): The SPIDER project (SPam over
Internet telephony Detection sERvice) released a public report
[171] providing an overview of SPIT threats and the relevant
European legal framework (both on an EU and national basis).
The second public report [172] focuses on SPIT detection and
prevention, summarizing some of the work done in this space
and defining criteria for evaluating the efficiency of anti-SPIT
mechanisms. The report classifies prior work according to
fulfillment of these criteria, expanding on the relative strengths
and weaknesses of each approach.
Dritsas et al. [173] and Marias et al. [174] survey the
risks of SPIT in SIP, the latter also taking into consideration
feedback from SIP operators. They then classify a number
of previously proposed anti-SPIT mechanisms along a pre-
vent/detect/handle axis. Dritsas et al. [175] survey a number of
anti-SPIT mechanisms and techniques against a set of criteria
that they argue is needed to identify a call as SPIT.
d’Heureuse et al. [176] give an overview of the various anti-
SPIT efforts in standardization bodies and propose an architec-
ture for dealing with unwanted communications composed of
5 stages: non-intrusive pre-call message analysis, interaction
with the caller, pre-connection callee feedback, call content
analysis and real-time callee feedback, and post-call callee
feedback.
c) Denial of Service (1 item): Sisalem et al. [177] give
an overview of SIP-based DoS attacks, looking at a couple
of specific scenarios. They provide some recommendations to
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implementors of VoIP systems that mitigate some of these
attacks.
d) P2P SIP (1 item): Seedorf [178] overviews the secu-
rity challenges in peer-to-peer (P2P) SIP. Threats specific to
P2P-SIP include subversion of the identity-mapping scheme
(which is specific to the overlay network used as a substrate),
attacks on the overlay network routing scheme, bootstrapping
communications in the presence of malicious first-contact
nodes, identity enforcement (Sybil attacks), traffic analysis and
privacy violation by intermediate nodes, and free riding by
nodes that refuse to route calls or otherwise participate in the
protocol other than to obtain service for themselves.
2) Field Studies and System/Protocol Analysis (12 items):
Wieser et al. [179] extend the PROTOS testsuite [180] with
a SIP-specific analysis fuzzing module. They then test their
system against a number of commercial SIP implementations,
finding critical vulnerabilities in all of them [181].
Berson [182] conducted an evaluation of the Skype system
under contract by Skype itself, allowing him access to the
source code. The evaluation focused primarily on the crypto-
graphic protocols and algorithms used, and did not discover
any significant issues. Baset and Schulzrinne [183] performed
a black-box analysis of Skype, identifying some characteris-
tics of the underlying protocol. Biondi and Desclaux [184]
dissected the Skype binary in detail, exposing the extensive
anti-reverse engineer and anti-debugging mechanisms built
in the program. Their analysis identified a small number of
vulnerabilities (including a buffer overflow).
Thermos and Hadsall [185] survey a number of Small Office
Home Office (SOHO) VoIP gateways and related equipment,
as provided by 3 different commercial VoIP providers with
different corporate profiles and customer bases. Their anal-
ysis looks at four key factors: manageability, node security,
signaling security, and media security. They find numerous
problems, including insecure access to the web-based manage-
ment interface, default passwords and inappropriate services,
lack of encryption to protect signaling and media, and low-
level implementation issues (e.g., presumed buffer overflow
vulnerabilities and fuzzing-induced crashes). A similar survey
by Scholz [186] looks at protocol and device problems and
vulnerabilities at a medium-size German ISP with high rate
of VoIP adoption. He focuses on intentional and uninten-
tional denial of service attacks, problems in customer-premises
equipment (e.g., SIP phones), and protocol-independent issues.
A number of problems are found, including DoS through call
forks, misconfigured devices, and lawful-interception evasion,
among others.
INRIA has been conducting a multi-thrust effort to apply
testing and fuzzing toward identifying vulnerabilities in SIP
protocols [187], implementations [188] and deployed systems
[189], [190]. It is worth noting that this work has resulted
in a number of vulnerability disclosures in the Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database and elsewhere.
Gupta and Shmatikov [191] formally analyze the security of
the VoIP protocol stack, including SIP, SDP, ZRTP, MIKEY,
SDES, and SRTP. Their analysis uncovers a number of flaws,
most of which derive from subtle inconsistencies in the
assumptions made in designing the different protocols. These
attacks include a replay attack in SDES that completely break
content protection, a man-in-the-middle attack in ZRTP, and
a (perhaps theoretical) weakness in the key derivation process
used in MIKEY. They also show several minor weaknesses
and vulnerabilities in all protocols, primarily enabling denial
of service attacks. Floroiu and Sisalem [192] also conduct a
comparative analysis of the security aspects of DTLS, ZRTP,
MIKEY and SDES. They describe a number of possible
attacks against these protocols, and propose mitigation ap-
proaches in some cases.
3) Performance Analysis (14 items): Reason and Messer-
chmitt [193], in one of the earliest works on the subject of the
performance impact of security mechanisms on VoIP, looked
specifically at the error-expansion properties of encryption and
their effect on voice quality. They analytically derive the post-
decryption Bit Error Rate (BER) relative to the pre-encryption
BER for block and stream ciphers, and analyze the effect
of error-expansion mitigation techniques, such as the use of
forward error correction, on quality of service. They discuss
an error-robust encryption scheme that is analogous to self-
synchronizing ciphers.
Elbayoumi and Shepherd [194] conduct a performance com-
parison of block and stream cipher encryption in the context
of securing VoIP calls. They analyze the impact of each on
end-to-end delay and subjective quality of perceived voice. A
broader view at several performance-impacting parameters is
given by the same authors in a concurrent paper at the same
journal [195].
Salsano et al. [196] give an overview of the various SIP
security mechanisms (as of 2002), focusing particularly on
the authentication component. They conduct an evaluation of
the processing costs of SIP calls that involve authentication,
under different transport, authentication and encryption sce-
narios. They show that a call using TLS and authentication
is 2.56 times more expensive than the simplest possible SIP
configuration (UDP, no security). However, a fully protected
call takes only 54% longer to complete than a configuration
that is more representative than the basic one but still offers no
security; the same fully-protected call has the same processing
cost if it is transported over TCP with no encryption (TLS).
Of the overhead, approximately 70% is attributed to message
parsing and 30% to cryptographic processing. With the advent
of Datagram TLS (DTLS) [197], it is possible that encryption
and integrity for SIP can be had for all configurations (UDP
or TCP) at no additional cost.
Barbieri et al. [198] find that when using VoIP over IPsec,
performance can drop by up to 63%; however, it is ques-
tionable whether these results still hold, given the use of
hardware accelerators and the more efficient AES algorithm in
IPsec. Simulation-based work by Ranganathan and Kilmartin
[199] shows that the use of IPsec with pre-established Security
Associations (SAs) increases SIP call setup time by 1.4% and
media (voice) transfer by 1.6%. However, when taking into
consideration the delay in establishing SAs for the first time
using a dynamic key-agreement protocol such as IKE [200] or
IKEv2 [201], the call setup delay can increase dramatically.
They identify encryption engine queuing delays as a potential
concern, as call volumes increase.
ANGELOS D. KEROMYTIS: A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF VOIP SECURITY RESEARCH 15
A conclusion similar to Salsano et al. [196] is reached by
Bilien [202] and Bilien et al. [203], [204], who study the
overhead in SIP call setup latency when using end-to-end
and hop-by-hop security mechanisms. They consider protocols
such as MIKEY, S/MIME, SRTP, TLS, and IPsec, concluding
that the overall penalty of using full-strength cryptography is
low.
Xiao and Zarrella [205] conduct an experimental evaluation
of the impact of security mechanisms on VoIP in wireless
environments with a specific voice codec. They specifically
look at how the use of IPsec and WEP affect the Mean Opinion
Score, packet loss, and delay of VoIP calls in 802.11 networks.
They find that WEP has a bigger impact on packet loss than
IPsec, but the latter can cause larger packet delays and fewer
but more extreme voice artifacts (disturbances) in the call.
Also in the context of VoIP for wireless networks, Lakay
and Agbinya [206] summarize similar experiments that show
SIP security mechanism processing is responsible for 80% of
the call setup delay when using stateless proxies, and 45% for
stateful proxies.
Eun-Chul et al. [207], evaluate via simulation the costs
of different security protocols (TLS, DTLS and IPsec) with
respect to call setup delay using different transport proto-
cols (TCP, UDP and SCTP). They conclude that the most
efficient combinations, DTLS/UDP and IPsec/UDP, approxi-
mately double the call setup delay. However, since the analysis
is purely simulation-based, their results are sensitive to the
configured relative costs for processing the various protocols.
Shen et al. [208] also study the performance impact of
using TLS as a transport protocol for SIP. In their experiments
using a testbed, they use profiling at various system levels
(application, library, and kernel), and decompose the costs at
a fine level of granularity. They determine that use of TLS can
reduce performance by a factor of up to 20 (when compared
with the unsecured SIP-over-UDP). The main overhead factor
is the cost of RSA signatures during session negotiation,
while symmetric key operations impose a relatively small cost.
They recommend that operators amortize the setup cost over
long-lived connections. Finally, they provide a cost model
for provisioning SIP-over-TLS servers, predicting an average
performance overhead of 15% under a suggested system
configuration.
Rebahi et al. [209] analyze the performance of RSA as used
in SIP for authentication and identity management (via public-
key certificates and digital signatures), and describe the use of
Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) within this context to improve
performance. Using ECDSA, their prototype can handle from
2 to 8 times as many call setup requests per second, with the
gap widening as key sizes increase.
4) Authentication Protocols (15 items): Buschel [210] ar-
gues for integrated authentication between User Agents and
all elements of a SIP infrastructure. Over the years, a number
of authentication schemes aiming to replace Digest Authenti-
cation have been proposed, using such basic blocks as Diffie
Hellman [211], Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) [212],
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [213],
nonces [214], PKI [215], [216] hash functions [217], and
others [218], not all of them secure [219].
Cao and Jennings [220] propose a new mechanism for
authenticating the responding user’s identity in SIP without
exposing said identity to untrusted intermediate elements.
Their scheme requires additional headers in SIP messages, and
has not been implemented or evaluated.
Insu and Keecheon [221] propose a secret key based mech-
anism to reduce the performance requirements of using public
key certificates to protect signaling (e.g., with TLS) in an
enterprise VoIP environment.
Schmidt et al. [222] suggest that administration overheads
for implementing strong authentication in SIP could be low-
ered by grouping users with the same function or role (e.g.,
agents in a calling center). They propose a proxy-based
mechanism for implementing a form of “certificate sharing”
among a group of users, without exposing the corresponding
private key to any of them. They demonstrate feasibility of the
scheme by implementing it in the NIST SIP proxy, with no
further evaluation.
Wang and Zhang [223] discuss an authentication and key
agreement mechanism for SIP that uses certificate-less public-
key cryptography. Certificate-less public-key cryptography
[224] is a variant of identity-based cryptography (where the
public key of an entity is its public identity); here, the
public key for an entity is generated collaboratively between
that entity and a trusted third party in such a way that the
public key can be verified by any other entity that knows
the public parameters under which the trusted third party
operates. Compared to previous proposals that used identity-
based cryptography [225], their scheme does not require that
the trusted third party
5) Architectures (19 items): Singh and Vuong [226] use
a mobile agent framework to collect and correlate events
from various network components, toward detecting a number
of attacks. The stated advantages of their approach are that
it does not require a new protocol for exchanging event
information and that mitigation and recovery capabilities can
be implemented by extending the framework and the agents,
with no changes to the VoIP protocols. They also propose
using user behavior profiles to detect anomalous behavior.
They describe the operation of their system in a number of
attack scenarios, including protocol-based denial of service,
call hijacking, packet flooding, and abnormal call patterns.
Casola et al. [227], [228] suggest the use of a policy-based
approach to design secure VoIP infrastructures. The policies
express security goals in measurable terms; suggested infras-
tructure designs can then be evaluated against these policies to
determine whether the goals are met to an acceptable degree.
Wu et al. [229] design an intrusion detection system, called
SCIDIVE, that is specific to VoIP environments. Specifically,
SCIDIVE aims to detect different classes of intrusions, can
operate with different viewpoints (on clients, proxies, or
servers), and takes into consideration both signaling (i.e.,
SIP) and media-transfer protocols (e.g., RTP). SCIDIVE’s
ability to correlate cross-protocol behavior, theoretically al-
lows for detection of more complex attacks. However, the
system is rules-based, which limits its effectiveness against
new/unknown attacks. The primary evaluation (conducted on
a small testbed) consists of four simple cross-protocol attacks,
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which would have evaded other contemporary, non-specialized
intrusion detection systems. In follow-on work, Apte et al.
[230], [231] develop SPACEDIVE, a VoIP-specific intrusion
detection system that allows for correlation of events among
distributed rules-based detectors. They demonstrate the ability
of SPACEDIVE to detect certain classes of attacks using a
simple SIP environment with two domains, and compare it
with SCIDIVE.
Martin and Hung [232] discuss a high-level policy for VoIP
applications, intended to guide the implementation, configura-
tion, and use of VoIP systems.
SNOCER4, a project funded by the European Union, is
“investigating approaches for overcoming temporal network,
hardware and software failures and ensuring the high availabil-
ity of the offered VoIP services based on low cost distributed
concepts.” The first public project report [233] provides an
overview of VoIP infrastructure components and the threats
that must be addressed (staying primarily at the protocol
and network level, and avoiding implementation issues with
the exception of SQL injection), along with possible defense
mechanisms. There is also discussion on scalable service
provisioning (replication, redundancy, backups etc.), toward
providing reliability and fault tolerance. The second public
project report [234] describes an architecture for protect-
ing against malformed messages and related attacks using
specification-based intrusion detection, protocol message veri-
fication, and redundancy. They use ontologies to describe SIP
vulnerabilities, to allow for easy updating of the monitoring
components (IDS) [235].
Niccolini et al. [236] design an intrusion detection/intrusion
prevention system architecture for use with SIP. Their system
uses both knowledge-based and behavior-based detection, ar-
ranged as a series in that order. They develop a prototype
implementation using the open-source Snort IDS. They eval-
uate the effectiveness of their system in an attack scenario
by measuring the mean end-to-end delay of legitimate SIP
traffic in the presence of increasing volumes of malformed
SIP INVITE messages.
Marshall et al. [237] describe the AT&T VoIP security
architecture. They divide VoIP equipment into three classes:
trusted, trusted-but-vulnerable, and untrusted. The latter con-
sists of the customer premises equipment, which is outside
the control of the carrier. The trusted domain includes all the
servers necessary to provide VoIP service. Between the two
sit various border and security elements, that are responsible
for protecting the trusted devices while permitting legitimate
communications to proceed. They describe the interactions
among the various components, and the security mechanisms
used in protecting these interactions.
Sher and Magedanz [238] describe a security architec-
ture for IMS service delivery platforms, focusing on time-
independent attacks (e.g., software vulnerabilities). The key
element of their proposed approach is an intrusion detection
and prevention system that inspects all incoming and outgoing
SIP messages to the IMS application servers, applying rules
that detect and mitigate specific attacks. A brief performance
4http://www.snocer.org/
evaluation shows that a prototype can operate with acceptable
delay parameters.
Ding and Su [239] propose the combination of specification-
based intrusion detection with anomaly detection techniques
and attack-specific methods using hierarchical colored Petri
nets.
Nassar et al. [240] advocate the use of SIP-specific honey-
pots to catch attacks targeting the Internet telephony systems,
protocols and applications. They design and implement such a
honeypot system, and explore the use of a statistical engine for
identifying attacks and other misbehavior, based on training on
legitimate traces of SIP traffic. The engine is based on their
prior work that uses Bayesian-based inference. The resulting
SIP honeypot effort is largely exploratory, with performance
and effectiveness evaluations left for future work. In follow-on
work, Nassar et al. [241] describe an intrusion detection and
prevention architecture for VoIP that integrates SIP honeypots
and an application-layer event correlation engine.
Barry and Chan [242] describe a host-based intrusion de-
tection architecture for SIP that combines specification-based
and signature-based detection, and allows for the correlation of
information across modules to identify cross-protocol attacks.
They conduct a simulation-based evaluation using OMNeT++
to determine detection accuracy and performance impact.
Rieck et al. [243] apply machine learning techniques to
detecting anomalous SIP messages, incorporating a “self-
learning” component by allowing for periodic re-training of the
anomaly detector using traffic that has been flagged as normal.
The features used for clustering are based on n-grams and on
tokenization of the SIP protocol. To prevent training attacks,
wherein an adversary “trains” the anomaly detector to accept
malicious inputs as legitimate, they employ randomization
(choosing random samples for the training set), sanitization
[244], and verification (by comparing the output of the new
and old training models). Their experimental prototype was
shown to handle 70 Mbps of SIP traffic, while providing a
99% detection rate with no false positives.
Dantu et al. [245] describe a comprehensive VoIP security
architecture, composed of components distributed across the
media gateway controller, the proxy server(s), the IP PBX, and
end-user equipment. These components explicitly exchange
information toward better training of filters, and creating
and maintaining whitelists/blacklists. Implicit feedback is also
provided through statistical analysis of interactions (e.g., call
frequency and duration). The architecture also provisions for
a recovery mechanism that incorporates explicit feedback and
quarantining.
6) Middleboxes (11 items): Reynolds and Ghosal [246]
describe a VoIP-aware middlebox architecture that integrates
the enterprise firewall, media gateway, and intrusion detection
facilities to allow the secure operation of dynamic VoIP
applications. The problem of firewall and NAT traversal by
VoIP protocols has been the subject of some research [247],
[248], [249], [250], generally involving some kind of signaling
(whether in-band or out-of-band) between the end-device and
the middlebox.
Bessis et al. [251] discuss the necessary features of a SIP-
specific firewall, juxtaposing them with specific threats to SIP
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messages at each network layer (data link, network, transport
and session). They propose a simple, hardware-accelerated
SIP-proxy as a front-end SIP firewall and argue that this
approach would block most of the attacks.
Gurbani et al. [252] propose an mechanism whereby proxies
create an overlay network between user agents. This network
is used for rendezvous/coordination purposes only. Once user
agents establish a session, the proxies become transparent
traffic forwarders, with the user agents communicating over
an end-to-end secure session. This approach allows users to
communicate without exposing (as much) private information
to proxies, at the cost of requiring a PKI and a new message
extension.
Sengar et al. [253], [254], [255] examine the problem of
cross-infrastructure vulnerabilities created by bridging VoIP
and PSTN networks. They outline a high-level architecture
that integrates firewall-like functionality with trust manage-
ment, signaling encryption and authentication, and intrusion
detection.
Ehlert et al. [256] describe a rule-reduction algorithm for
improving the performance of firewalls operating in busy
VoIP environments, in balance with security requirements.
Their algorithm works by merging similar single-mapped rules
into a more general rule, then dropping less important rules,
and finally calculating the accuracy of the new ruleset. If
needed, their algorithm re-iterates until an acceptable solution
is achieved.
7) Intrusion Detection (11 items): Mandjes et al. [257],
[258] describe the use of statistical techniques to identify
anomalies in VoIP networks. Their work is primarily directed
at non-adversarial anomalies, although certain attacks (such as
denial of service) would also be detected by their scheme.
Geneiatakis et al. [259], [260] discuss malformed-message
attacks against SIP servers and equipment, primarily depend-
ing on the PROTOS testsuite for SIP implementations [180].
To detect such attacks, they propose building an intrusion
detection system that leverages the SIP syntax grammar [8] to
decompose incoming messages, and a grammar for specifying
rules that check whether specific constraints are being violated
(or specific conditions met) [261], [262]. In subsequent work,
Geneiatakis and Keromytis [263] apply entropy theory and
“itself information” to the problem of identifying anomalies
in a stream of SIP messages.
However, Hantehzadeh et al. [264] point out that the most
approaches to anomaly detection in SIP use datasets with
large differences between anomalous and normal messages,
which make them easy to detect. An analysis using a dataset
with minimal such differences (while maintaining the dis-
tinction between malicious and normal messages) indicates
that existing classification schemes do not perform as well.
They propose feature reduction techniques to enhance these
classification schemes even on “trickier” datasets. Similar
results, focusing specifically on the performance of classifiers
using Euclidean distance, are discussed by Mehta et al. [265].
Sengar et al. [255] model the protocol state machine of
individual SIP nodes (derived from the SIP specification) and
inter-node interactions, in order to have a complete picture of
the overall system state towards detecting anomalous behavior
and attacks. This is particularly important in VoIP, since nodes
can interact in many ways, and with several other nodes
during a call and throughout their operation. They conduct
a performance evaluation to determine the overhead added to
call setup and media transfer by their system, and its overall
scalability. While their system can identify known attacks (for
which attack patterns can be specified) with high accuracy
and low false positives, detecting previously unknown attacks
depends on the fidelity of the protocol state machines. This
problem is left for future work.
Seo et al. [266] develop a stateful intrusion detection system
for SIP, modeling SIP state transitions to match the expected
state of the monitored SIP entities. Their system allows the
specification of rules that match attacks and misbehavior based
not only on the content of the communications but also on the
state of the SIP call and of the proxies.
8) Miscellaneous (2 items): Cao et al. [267] describe how
to transparently add information in SIP and H.323 messages
such that calls can be tracked across the network. A simi-
lar approach, leveraging watermarking of VoIP content, was
previously described by Steinebach et al. [268].
V. DISCUSSION
In our previous work [1], [2], [3], we surveyed 215 vul-
nerabilities in SIP implementations that had been disclosed
in the CVE database from 1999 to 2009. We classified these
vulnerabilities along several dimensions, including the VoIPSA
threat taxonomy, the traditional {Confidentiality, Integrity,
Availability} concerns, and a {Protocol, Implementation, Con-
figuration} axis. We found that the various types of denial of
service attacks constitute the majority of disclosed vulnerabili-
ties, over 90% of which were due to implementation problems
and 7% due to configuration.
Considering the research work we have surveyed (some of
which was discussed in this paper), we can see that out of
a total of 245 publications, almost 20% concern themselves
with an overview of the problem space and of solutions — a
figure we believe is reasonable, considering the enormity of
the problem space and the speed of change in the protocols,
standards, and implementations. We also see a considerable
amount of effort (roughly 20%) going toward addressing SPIT.
While SPIT does not appear to be a major issue with VoIP
users at this point, our past and current experiences with email
spam and telemarketing seems to provide sufficient motivation
for research in this area. Most of the work is focused on
identifying SPIT calls and callers based on behavioral traits,
although a number of other approaches are under exploration
(e.g., CAPTCHAs and real-time content analysis). One of the
problems is the lack of a good corpus of data for experimen-
tation and validation of the proposed techniques.
We were also not surprised to see a sizable portion of
research (over 15%) directed at design, analysis (both security-
and performance-oriented), and attacking of cryptographic
protocols as used in VoIP. The cryptographic research com-
munity appears to be reasonably comfortable in proposing
tweaks and minor improvements to the basic authentication
mechanisms, and the systems community appears content with
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analyzing the performance of different protocol configurations
(e.g., TLS vs. IPsec).
Most distressing, however, is the fact that comparatively
little research (less than 13%) is going toward addressing the
problem of denial of service. Given the numerical dominance
of SIP-specific DoS vulnerabilities (as described earlier) and
the ease of launching such attacks, it is clear that significantly
more work is needed here. What work is being done seems to
primarily focus on the server and infrastructure side, despite
our finding that half of DoS-related vulnerabilities are present
on endpoints. Furthermore, much of the existing work focuses
on network-observable attacks (e.g., “obviously” malformed
SIP messages), whereas the majority of VoIP DoS vulnerabil-
ities are the result of implementation failures. More generally,
additional work is needed in strengthening implementations,
rather than introducing middleboxes and network intrusion
detection systems, whose effectiveness has been shown to be
limited in other domains; taking a black box approach in
securing VoIP systems is, in our opinion, not going to be
sufficient.
Also disconcerting is the lack of research (2.8%) in address-
ing service abuse threats, considering the visibility of large
fraud incidents [4], [5], [6].
In general, we found little work that took a “big picture”
view of the VoIP security problem. What cross-cutting ar-
chitectures have been proposed focus primarily on intrusion
detection. Work is needed to address cross-implementation and
cross-protocol problems, above and beyond the few efforts
along those lines in the intrusion detection space.
Finally, we note that none of the surveyed works addressed
the problem of configuration management. While such prob-
lems represent only 7% of known vulnerabilities, configuration
issues are easy to overlook and are likely under-represented
in our previous analysis due to the nature of vulnerability
reporting.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a survey of 245 publications on the topic
of VoIP security, classifying them according to the VoIPSA
threat taxonomy. We juxtaposed this survey against our previ-
ous analysis on VoIP security vulnerabilities. We identified two
specific areas (denial of service and service abuse) as being
under-represented in research efforts directed at them (relative
to their importance in the vulnerability survey). Furthermore,
we identify implementation bugs and misconfigurations as two
general problem areas that merit considerably more work than
they currently attract. We hope that our work will ease the
task of conducting research in VoIP security and help guide
the often disjoint research efforts.
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